UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-27-2013

State v. Hogue Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40872

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hogue Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40872" (2013). Not Reported. 1376.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1376

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN

OF THE STATE OF IDA

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

OPY

40872

)

)
)

vs.

Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2011-3728

)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

BRIAN ELLIOT HOGUE,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
AUTHORITI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case... .. .. ... .. .. ... . . . ... ... .. .... .. ... . .. ... .. . ... .. .. .. ... .. .. 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1
ISSUE .................................................................................................... ..
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 5
Hogue Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused
Its Discretion By Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty
Pleas Given His Failure To Establish Manifest Injustice ....................... 5
Introduction ............................................................................... 5
B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................ 6

C.

Hogue Failed To Preserve His Argument That The
District Court Failed To Warn Him Of The Direct
Consequences Of His Guilty Pleas ............................................ 6

D.

Even If Hague's Argument Was Preserved, He Has
Failed To Establish Manifest Injustice Necessitating
The Withdrawal Of His Guilty Pleas ............................................ 7

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Carter v. State, 116 Idaho 468, 776 P.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1
Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho

............................ g

869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994) ......................... 6

Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 754 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................ 7
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,982 P.2d 931 (1999) ........................................... 8, 9
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct.

1982) ............................ 7

State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,787 P.2d 281 (1990) ..................................... 7
State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 767 P.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1989) ........................ 8
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1991) ......................................... 6
State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177,857 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993) .......................... 7
State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 211 P.3d 775 (Ct. App. 2008)..........

......... 6

State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 156 P.3d 1193 (2007) .......................................... 7
State v. Hogue, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 530,
Docket No. 40005 (Idaho App., June 10, 2013) ......................................... 2
State v. Hogue, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 567,
Docket No. 40273 (Idaho App., July 5, 2013) ............................................. 2
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) .......................................... 6
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 55 P.3d 879 ..................................................... 9
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ........................................... 8
State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 941 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1997) ........................ 6
State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 4 P.3d 570 (Ct. App. 2000) .......................... 8, 9, 10
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 208 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................... 7
State v. Thomas, 154 Idaho 305, 297 P.3d 268 (Ct. App. 2013) ........................ 7, 8

ii

RULES
C
I.C.R.

11 ................................................................ 8
.... ........... .......... .... ........ ..... ........ ..... ... ............. . . ................... 7

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Hogue
motion

denying his

from

his guilty plea following sentencing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In February

11, police investigated Hogue in connection with a series of

bad checks he issued to numerous individuals and businesses in the Boise area.
(R., pp.109-111.)

investigation revealed that Hogue paid a rent deposit, and

purchased a vehicle, household goods, electronics, and furniture from local
retailers with the bad checks. (Id.) Boise police officers obtained and executed a
warrant to search Hague's residence.

(R., pp.115-121.)

Officers seized

evidence relevant to the investigation, including several computers. (R., pp.3132; 115-121.) The state charged Hogue with three counts of grand theft, and
three counts of felony issuing a check without funds (Case No. CR 2011-03728).
(R., pp.96-98.) While these charges were pending, a forensic examination of the
computers recovered from Hague's residence revealed evidence of the presence
of child pornography.

(R., pp.31-32.)

In a separate case, the state charged

Hogue with two counts of possession of sexually exploitative material. See Idaho
Data Repository, Ada County, Case No. CR 2011-20152.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hogue pied guilty to one count of grand
theft, and one count of issuing a check without funds, and the state agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges in Case No. CR 2011-03728.

1

(See generally

#40005 1 1/27/12 Tr.) At the time of his guilty pleas, Hague's child pornography
case, CR 2011-20152, was still in its preliminary hearing stage. (#40005 1/27/12
Tr., p.2, Ls.10-16; see also Idaho Data Repository, Ada County, Case No. CR
2011-20152.) Still, the state agreed to recommend that Hague's grand theft and
issuing a check without funds charges run concurrent with his future sentence in
the child pornography case.

(#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.2, Ls.10-20.) The district

court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years with five years fixed for grand
theft, and a concurrent fixed sentence of three years for issuing a check without
funds. (#40005 5/8/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-20.) The court recognized that it could not
impose these sentences concurrently with any future sentence that may later be
imposed in Case No. CR 2011-20152, but stated that it had "no objection" to the
presiding judge in that case imposing its sentence concurrently to those in Case
No. CR 2011-03728. (#40005 5/8/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-18.)
In Case No. CR 2011-20152, Hogue eventually pied guilty to one count of
possession of sexually exploitative material.

See State v. Hogue, 2013

Unpublished Opinion No. 567, Docket No. 40273 (Idaho App., July 5, 2013). The
district court in that case imposed Hogue's sentence consecutively to his prior
grand theft and issuing a check without funds sentences imposed in Case No.
CR 2011-03728.

kl,

p.1.

Hogue then filed a prose motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in case CR
1

The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the clerk's record and
reporter's transcript filed in prior appeal No. 40005, in which Hogue challenged
the sentences imposed in the same underlying criminal case that is the subject of
this appeal. (R., p.2); see also State v. Hogue, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No.
530, Docket No. 40005 (Idaho App., June 10, 2013).

2

No. 2011-03728. (R., pp.22-33.) Hogue alleged that his guilty pleas to the grand
theft and issuing a check without funds charges were involuntary and unknowing
because, during his pretrial detainment at the Ada County jail, he was placed in a
"behavior modification plan," and was denied access to his attorney, legal
documents, and legal mail, and because his appointed attorneys failed to bring
this to the attention of the court (Id.) The district court denied Hague's motion.
(R., pp.34-40.) Hogue timely appealed. (R., pp.49-53.)

3

ISSUE

as:

on

Did
district court abuse its discretion when it
motion withdraw his
plea?

state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Hogue failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
given his failure to establish
manifest injustice?
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ARGUMENT
Hoaue Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion Bv
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Pleas Given His Failure To Establish
Manifest Injustice

Introduction
Hogue contends that the

court abused its discretion in denying

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to grand theft and issuing a check without
funds.

(See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Hogue contends, for the

first time on appeal, that his pleas were unknowing because he was not aware
that the district court lacked the authority to impose his sentences concurrently
with future sentences that had

yet been imposed. (Id.) Hogue argues that

this was a direct consequence of his guilty pleas of which the district court was
required to specifically advise him. (Id.)
This Court should not consider Hague's argument because he failed to
preserve it for appeal. VVhile Hogue moved to withdraw his guilty pleas below, he
did so on entirely separate grounds than he raises on appeal. Further, even if
Hogue had preserved this issue, he has failed to show manifest injustice that
would necessitate the withdrawal of his guilty pleas.

A district court is not

required to warn a defendant of the possibility that a future sentencing court
might run its sentence consecutively to the defendant's current sentence.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Hogue Failed To Preserve His Argument That The District Court Failed To
Warn Him Of The Direct Consequences Of His Guilty Pleas
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time

on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1991). The
district court must be given the opportunity to correct any alleged errors.

In this

case, Hogue moved for the withdrawal of his pleas, however he did so on a
completely different ground than he raises on appeal.

Rather than raise any

issue regarding potential future sentences that may be imposed consecutively,
Hogue asserted his pleas were not knowing or voluntary because, during his
pretrial detention, he was denied access to his attorney, legal documents, and
legal mail, and because his appointed attorneys failed to bring this to the
attention of the court. (R., pp.22-33.)
Because Hogue never gave the district court the opportunity to address
his assertion that it erred by failing to advise him of the possibility that future

6

sentencing courts may impose their sentences consecutively to his current
sentences, this issue is not preserved and this Court shouid not consider it on
appeal.

D.

Even If Hague's Argument Was Preserved. He Has Failed To Establish
Manifest lniustice Necessitating The \fJithdrawal Of His Guilty Pleas
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after

sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court
may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c).
The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty
plea. "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796,
802 (Ct. App. 1982). The stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not
"encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and
withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea should be withdrawn. ~; State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho
177,178,857 P.2d 656,657 (Ct. App. 1993).
Manifest injustice is established as a matter of law where a plea is "not
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards." State v. Thomas,
154 Idaho 305, 307, 297 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2013); see also State v.

7

Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007).

Constitutional due

process standards require "that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently," as shown by the "record of the entire proceedings, including
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Thomas, 154 Idaho at 307, 297 P.3d at
270 (citing I.C.R. 11 (c)).
In Idaho, the trial court must follow the minimum requirements of I.C.R.
11(c) in accepting guilty pleas. State v. Mauro. 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d
109, 111 (1991) (quoting State v. Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446, 767 P.2d 286,
289 (Ct. App. 1989)). If the record indicates that the trial court followed the
requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is
voluntary and knowing. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824 P.2d at 111. One of the
requirements of I. C.R. 11 (c) is showing that "[t]he defendant was informed of the
consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and
other direct consequences which may apply." I.C.R. 11 (c)(2).
Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the
defendant of the direct consequences of the plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,
99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999). A consequence is direct if it presents "a definite,
immediate and largely automatic effect on the defendant's range of punishment."
State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 460, 4 P.3d 570, 572 (Ct. App. 2000). A
consequence is more likely to be direct if the defendant has no power to prevent
the consequence, if the nature of the consequence is punitive, and if the
sentencing judge has control over imposing the consequence. Ray, 133 Idaho at
99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36.

However, a court is not required to inform a

8

defendant of consequences of a guilty plea that are merely collateral or indirect.
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880; Ray, 133 Idaho at 99101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. A contingent possibility resulting from a guilty plea is
not a direct consequence embraced by Rule 11. See Carter v. State, 116 Idaho
468, 468-469, 776 P.2d 830, 830-831 (Ct. App. 1989).
In Miller, the defendant moved for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas to
three counts of burglary prior to sentencing, alleging that at the time of his pleas
he was not informed that his Idaho offenses could be used against him for
sentencing purposes in criminal cases in Washington that were pending at the
time of his Idaho guilty pleas. Miller, 134 Idaho at 459, 4 P.3d at 570. However,
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a sentence's possible enhancing effect on
subsequent sentences in a case where a conviction had not yet been entered
was merely a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.
571-573.

kl

at 459-461, 4 P.3d at

The Court recognized that the potential impact of Miller's Idaho

sentence on his future Washington sentences was entirely contingent upon the
resolution of the Washington case and the sentencing determinations of the
Washington court:
Miller could have been afforded the benefit of plea
agreements in Washington which Miller could have either accepted
or declined. Terms of those agreements could have included
sentencing recommendations on the part of the state or
agreements by the state to recommend that the Washington trial
courts not use Miller's Idaho offenses when they fashioned his
sentences. Additionally, Miller could have been acquitted of the
Washington charges. Thus, it was only a contingent possibility that
· his Idaho offenses would be considered in fashioning his sentences
in Washington. The use of Miller's Idaho guilty pleas in Washington
was not a "definite, immediate, and largely automatic" consequence
of his guilty pleas in Idaho. Therefore, Miller has not shown that the

9

district court failed to comply with I.C.R. 11(c) when it accepted his
guilty pleas.

kl at 461, 4 P.3d at 573 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in the present case, the impact of Hague's grand theft and
issuing checks without funds sentences on his future sentence for possession of
sexually exploitative material was entirely contingent on the resolution of the
latter case, which was still pending at the time of Hague's guilty pleas in the
present case. Thus, the district court's decision to run Hague's possession of
sexually exploitative material conviction consecutively to Hague's previous
sentences was not a "definitive, immediate, and largely automatic" consequence
of Hague's pleas to grand theft and issuing a check without funds. Further, the
district court that accepted Hague's pleas in the present case had no power over
the other sentencing court's later sentencing determination. For these reasons,
the possibility that Hague's possession of sexually exploitative material sentence
might be run consecutively to his grand theft and issuing a check without funds
sentences was merely a potential collateral consequence of Hogue's guilty pleas
in the present case.

Therefore, the district court was not required to inform

Hogue of this possibility. 2

the district court did inform Hogue, in general terms, and prior to
the entry of his guilty pleas, that "sentence[s] can be imposed consecutively in
Idaho." (#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.20-23.) While the district court was warning
Hogue specifically of the possibility that it itself could impose Hague's grand theft
and issuing a check without funds sentences consecutively, the court gave no
reason for Hogue to believe that it was unlawful for a court to impose a sentence
consecutively to a previous sentence in a separate case. The court also warned
Hogue that the parties' sentencing recommendations were not binding on it and
that "the only person who can promise you what sentence you will receive is the
judge." (#40005 1/27/12 Tr., p.11, L.22- p.12, L.4.)
2 Additionally,
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The district court was not required to warn Hogue that it had no authority
to impose its sentences concurrently with future sentences which had not yet
been imposed, or that future sentencing judges may impose their sentences
consecutively to its own sentences.

Hogue has therefore failed to establish

manifest injustice that would necessitate a withdrawal of his guilty pleas.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial
of Hogue's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
DATED this 27th day of December, 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of December, 2013 served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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